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Under the policies of the United States, it will be very difficult to prohibit schools of this kind 
unless it were definitely proven that they were teaching treasonable things. 
   --- P. P. Claxton, U. S. Commissioner of Education2 
 
 
This article critically examines how the 1919 Federal Survey of Education in Hawaii, under the 
guise of a scientific study to guide educational reform was used as the means to implement colonial policies 
over the territory’s largest ethnic group, the Nikkei, people of Japanese ancestry.  Furthermore, the survey 
was also used by various other political and religious parties and individuals to further their own objectives.  
Although there were many facets to the federal survey, this study focuses only on the debate surrounding 
Japanese language schools, the most sensational issue of the survey. The battle over the control of Japanese 
language schools among the white ruling class, educational authorities, and the Nikkei community in 
Hawaii created the foundation for an anti-Japanese language school movement that spread to the West 
Coast of the United States. The survey was also a catalyst for Nikkei in redefining their Japanese language 
schools and a battleground concerning their future and identity. Despite numerous studies on Japanese 
Americans in Hawaii,3 and studies of the Japanese language schools,4 neither the process, results, nor 
effects of the survey have been critically examined to date. This paper analyzes the process of how the 
federal survey evolved and arrived at its conclusions through an examination of the Education Bureau’s 
files in order to illuminate the origins of the Japanese language school control movement and its chapter of 
ethnic American educational history.  
The Federal Survey of Education in Hawaii, conducted in 1919, is among the most influential 
education surveys done by the United States Bureau of Education in the years following World War I.  The 
opportunity to invite a survey committee to any community was offered nationwide by the federal 
government. It was intended to provide a “first hand study of local conditions” conducted by national 
education leaders to share their expertise with local authorities so that “children of all the people may be 
prepared for national life.”5 School surveys, which flourished from the late 1910s to 1920s,6 were both an 
instrument of progressive educators and a reflection of the movement’s values. 
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As historian Diane Ravitch and others have demonstrated, progressive education was a “complex 
series of related movements.”7  One of the tenets of progressive education was to examine the whole 
educational environment surrounding a school using “objective” methods in order to discover the “facts” 
and offer recommendations for educators to “base action on evidence rather than on tradition or 
speculation.”8 Surveys were supposed to bring local educational issues and facts into the public sphere.   
When the federal survey came to Hawaii, the governor, the superintendent of public schools, as 
well as civic, business, and religious leaders, each had their own research agenda and attempted to 
influence the survey team’s “scientific study.”  The primary issue the territorial legislature requested the 
survey to investigate was the 163 Japanese language schools accused of instilling “anti-Americanism” in 
over 20,000 Japanese American students in Hawaii.  During World War I, the American public’s tensions 
over ethnic diversity became intense; the dominant group’s perception of immigrants was that diversity 
signified disloyalty, creating the impulse for “100 percent Americanism” throughout the early 1920s.9 In 
education, Americanizers in states such as California and Minnesota, mandated English by law as the basic 
language of instruction in elementary schools both public and private, while other states, such as Nebraska, 
prohibited teaching a foreign language in early grades at any school.10  In Hawaii, the casting of Japanese 
language schools as an “educational problem” reflected the control aspirations of the Territorial 
Department of Public Instruction (DPI), supposedly representing the people’s interest, despite the fact that 
nearly half of Hawaii’s population was of Japanese descent.  
 
Background 
As Gary Okihiro, Ronald Takaki, and others have demonstrated, there was an interplay between 
colonialism and the recruitment of Japanese to Hawaii as laborers on sugar cane plantations.11 Hawaii’s 
sugar industry grew rapidly and became the center of power on the islands controlled by a group of elite 
haole, Caucasians, who were mostly descendents of pioneering American and British missionaries.12 The 
Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 enabled Hawaii to send sugar tariff-free to the United States and tremendously 
boosted Hawaii’s economy; as can be seen by the growth of plantations from 20 in 1875 to 63 only five 
years later.13 The increase, however, aggravated labor shortages which were already strained when Chinese 
workers who were initially recruited as plantation laborers abandoned their abysmal working conditions 
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once they completed their contracts. Even before the first 150 Japanese immigrants, the gannenmono, were 
brought to Hawaii in 1868, Japanese were envisioned as the solution to Hawaii’s labor needs.14 The Nikkei 
population steadily increased to about 60,000 in 1900, 80,000 in 1910, and 110,000 by 1920, representing 
42.7% of the Islands’ population.15  Planters were initially overjoyed as many Japanese workers in the 
1900s changed their perspectives from one of sojourners to settlers.  Workers brought wives and “picture 
brides”16 from Japan, so that by 1920 the second generation, or Nisei, made up 44.5% of the territory’s 
Nikkei population.17 Many whites feared that the Japanese Americans in Hawaii would dominate the 
Islands, a paranoia built on Japan’s military victories and colonialism in Asia and increasing Nikkei 
assertiveness in the 1909 and 1920 plantation strikes.  This paranoia was exacerbated by the fear that the 
Nisei, who were American citizens (their parents were not allowed to become American citizens until 
1952), would become the dominant-voting block in the territory’s electorate.  This specter was fanned by a 
network of Japanese exclusionists who dramatized the increase of Nikkei in Hawaii18 as a part of their 
campaign to exclude Japanese immigration and limit Japanese ability to own land and even to remove the 
constitutional protection of the Nisei’s American citizenship.19 
The first Japanese language school in Hawaii was established in 189320 to teach Japanese to Nisei 
children in order to assist their smooth transition when they went “back home” and entered a school in 
Japan. Japanese immigrant parents in Hawaii, many of whom worked from dawn to dusk in plantations, 
appreciated the schools as daycare facilities as well as their teaching “correct” Japanese to Nisei who spoke 
a mixture of English, Japanese, and Hawaiian.  Hawaii’s Japanese language schools were administered by 
groups of parents, Christian churches, or Buddhist temples, and were supported by tuition fees.  Many were 
also subsidized by plantation owners who primarily saw them as incentives to keep their cheap labor on the 
farm.21 Planters welcomed Buddhist missions at first since they used racial/cultural differences to prevent 
unity among laborers and to foster inter-group competition.  Buddhist priests and planters saw each other as 
serving mutual interests; Buddhist priests, initially standing on the side of the planters, reconciled troubles 
between Japanese workers and their plantation managers in exchange for the planter’s support for their 
ministry. With some exceptions, this symbiotic relationship continued until the 1919 higher wage 
movement. Then, Bishop Imamura of Hongwanji and priests of several other Buddhist sects sent a letter 
asking the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA) to yield to the demands of the Japanese laborers. 
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This eventually worsened into total confrontation as negotiations fell through, leading to the 1920 Oahu 
sugar plantation strike when Japanese schools were used for strike meetings and shelters for dispossessed 
workers.22 Buddhist teachers and officials of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association played a prominent 
role in the six-month strike.23  
 The religious war between Christian and Buddhist clergy characterizes another aspect of the 
Japanese language school controversy in Hawaii.  Japanese Christians started missionary work in the 
Islands around the 1890s and initially managed to convince some Issei, first generation Japanese 
immigrants, to send their children to Christian Japanese schools.  The majority of Issei, who were 
predominantly Buddhist,  “considered Christianity an irrational and austere religion”24 and soon joined the 
Buddhist temples and their Japanese language schools once they were established at the turn of the century.  
As a result, enrollment at the school established by Rev. Takie Okumura, a leader of the Japanese Christian 
missionaries in Honolulu, plunged overnight.25 With large congregations and the planters’ endorsements, 
Buddhist denominational schools, especially Hongwanji’s, prospered, suggesting to some that “the 
Japanese were determined to stoutly resist assimilation and to reinforce their own religious and cultural 
heritage.”26 They became a target of the post-World War I Americanization movement that often blurred 
the line between “Americanizing” and Christian proselytizing. Christians charged Buddhist schools with 
raising children as “subjects of the Japanese Emperor.”  As this religious rivalry escalated, Rev. Okumura, 
losing so much of the battle to the Buddhist temples, seized any chances to label Buddhist temples and 
schools as un-American and constantly projected this image to the public.27 Hawaii’s leading dailies, the 
Pacific Commercial Advertiser and Honolulu Star Bulletin, also alleged involvement of the Japanese 
government in plotting “a peaceful invasion” of the United States.28 
Japanese language schools were also perceived as a competitor of and even a threat to public 
education.  Of the 20,651 Japanese students who accounted for close to 50% of Hawaii’s public schools’ 
enrollment, 20,196 or 97.8% also attended Japanese language schools in 1920.29  In this early period, 
Japanese language schools were conducted in accordance with the principles of the Japanese National 
Education policy and followed  the way that Japanese public elementary schools were conducted.30  
Schools brought teachers from Japan, adopted textbooks complied by the Japanese Ministry of Education, 
and celebrated Japanese holidays including the Emperor’s birthday.  On the Emperor’s birthday, many 
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Nisei children did not go to public schools and attended the ceremony held in their Japanese language 
schools, paying respect to the Emperor’s picture and reading the Imperial Rescript on Education.  Because 
of the absences of the majority of the students, some of Hawaii’s public schools had no choice but to close 
for the day.31  Public school teachers also complained of Japanese American children who spoke “Hawaii 
Creole English,” popularly called “Pidgin English.”32  This actually was not a “problem” of only Japanese 
children. In fact, “only 2 or 3 percent of all students entering public school spoke Standard English” as late 
as 1920.33  Public school teachers blamed this language problem on Japanese language schools. White 
parents also protested that their children were placed in classes “where Hawaii Creole English was the 
spoken language, and where, among ‘swarms of Orientals,’ their children would ‘unconsciously pick up 
and adopt Oriental manners and mannerisms.’”34 Until 1910, most children from haole families who were 
in the upper class went to a private school that limited the admission of non-whites.35 However, continued 
migration of middle-class whites, following Hawaii’s 1898 annexation by the United States, completely 
changed the territory’s educational contours. These white children, unable to attend costly and overcrowded 
private schools,36 were sent to public schools with Asian American children. Frustrated white parents 
complained about the public school system and demanded sweeping changes.37  
Amid this turmoil, former Territorial Senator Albert F. Judd38 launched a Japanese school control 
law campaign on January 4, 1919 in the Islands’ leading newspaper, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser.  
He proposed a bill that would require public and private school teachers to pass a certification exam on 
knowledge of English,39 American history and civics.  Understandably, Japanese language educators 
strongly opposed Judd’s bill since, if enacted, it would mean the death of most schools as few Japanese 
teachers spoke fluent English. After the territorial legislature tabled the bill, on March 10 Lorrin Andrews, 
a Republican offspring of an old Hawaii missionary family, proposed to the House that all private schools 
be licensed by the DPI and that an inspector of foreign language schools should be appointed.40 While 
Andrews’ bill was still in the House, the Chairman of the House Education Committee, Henry Lyman, 
revived the Judd bill on March 20, and on April 11 he introduced another bill to restrict the operating hours 
of language schools.41 Facing strong protests from the Japanese community and perhaps having an 
awareness of the State Department’s warning to California to halt its exclusion movement,42 the legislature 
passed neither Andrews’ nor Lyman’s bills. After these school control bills failed in 1919, the legislature 
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passed an act authorizing Governor Charles McCarthy and Superintendent of Public Instruction Vaughan 
MacCaughey to request the United States Bureau of Education to conduct a survey of education in Hawaii.   
 
Precursors to the Survey 
Momentum for the 1919 Federal Educational Survey had actually developed over time.  
Correspondence between Commissioner of the Bureau of Education, Philander P. Claxton and other 
interested parties in Hawaii illustrate how the mission of the federal study evolved, and the Japanese 
language school issue became the focus of the 1919 survey.  As early as June 1914, H. B. Penhallow, 
Chairman of the Hawaii Senate Committee on Education, requested the Bureau of Education to investigate 
the possibility “for the College of Hawaii43 to take over the Normal School as a preparatory department” 
and also study administrative aspects of the DPI.44 Although Claxton acknowledged Penhallow’s request, 
Claxton received no response to a follow-up inquiry.45  
Two years later, Agnes Weaver, Chairman of the Service Committee of the College Club, a social 
reform organization of some 200 college-educated women in the islands,46 wrote Claxton. Weaver 
complained of the poor quality of teachers that the Territorial Normal School supplied for public grammar 
and primary schools in Hawaii; the majority of whom, she noted, were of Asian ancestry. She claimed that 
the graduates of the Normal School had merely four years of training at the school above the eighth grade, 
and that they have better opportunities for employment than more qualified teachers among “our very own” 
(presumably whites), who added teacher’s training to their high school diploma and college degree in the 
mainland United States.47  The club empowered its critique of the status quo by flexing white supremacy. 
Commenting on a list of Normal School graduates the College Club states:  
Notice how largely they are drawn from social group the least American in blood and 
bringing up. That they should share in all forms of our Island life is best, but that they 
should dominate our schools, seems doubtful.48   
 
Contrary to Weaver’s claim, however, the statistics showing the ethnicity of teachers in Hawaii’s public 
schools in 1916 indicate that whites occupied 52% (American 47.8% and British 4.2%), and the total of 
Portuguese, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean all combined accounted for only 15.4% of all teaching 
positions, despite the fact that students of these groups made up over 72% of the public school 
population.49  We cannot test Weaver’s claim as to whether whites who received higher education outside 
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the Islands were treated unequally with graduates of the Hawaii Normal School in either “salary or in other 
conditions of employment,”50 but the statistics above show that the “social group” Weaver perceived as
“the least American in blood and bringing up” certainly did not dominate public education in Ha
 
waii.   
Weaver who was frustrated by months of resistance by Governor Lucius E. Pinkham and the 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Henry W. Kinney against a federal survey, implored Claxton, “The 
governor is on the ragged edge of nervous breakdown, senile dementia and insane egotism,” and  “the 
Superintendent . . . has never made good in [sic] anything.”51 Weaver further classified the commissioners 
as big businessmen, who “take their work as Commissioners lightly.” She even accused the Inspector 
General of Schools and the Superintendent of the Normal Schools of being corrupt.52  Weaver begged 
Claxton to come to Hawaii on his own initiative.53 Governor Pinkham, knowing of the College Club’s 
direct plea to Claxton, defended himself, writing to Claxton, “there seems to be a rather hazy idea being 
publicly expressed by these ladies that there should be a Federal Survey made of our schools.”54 After 
stalling on the issue for several months, Pinkham sent an “unofficial” invitation for Claxton to come to the 
Territory of Hawaii as a “personal visit,” but not for an official investigation.55  He asked Claxton to 
investigate a way to improve the Islands’ institutions of higher education, but insisted that the focus not be 
on the quality of the Normal School.56 Later, at a meeting with Weaver and Kate W. Forbes, President of 
the College Club, Pinkham finally conceded to the demands for a federal survey.57  
On April 12, 1917, Pinkham signed a bill officially inviting a federal survey;58 however, the 
invitation from the governor was not sent for another nine months.  Superintendent Kinney also wrote 
Claxton to welcome his survey committee.  In his letter, Kinney described Hawaii’s situation as one of 
getting public school students “to turn towards agricultural and mechanical directions” rather than “clerical 
and similar occupations.” From this perspective, he asked Claxton to send “practical school men, Normal 
trained and with actual experience as teachers, rather than educational theorists.”59  Meanwhile though, 
Charles James McCarthy succeeded Pinkham as governor on June 22, 1918,60 which postponed the survey 
until the new governor officially re-invited the Commissioner’s survey team.61  Claxton wrote McCarthy 
that he was planning to conduct the survey from January to March 1919.62  However, the bureau’s work in 
postwar educational planning again delayed the survey team.  
7 
These exchanges between Claxton and different parities in Hawaii exemplified worldviews of 
Hawaii’s hegemony in the two decades following annexation.  In Hawaii, major positions in the territorial 
government remained appointments, and most government officials were under the influence, if not 
control, of the oligarchy,63 white business leaders who started as agents for the sugar plantations, but later 
built complex interlocking corporations. They monopolized insurance, utilities, wholesale and retail 
merchandising firms as well as rail and sea transportation, thus controlling much more than simply the 
territory’s economy.64   
The concern of territorial officials, under the oligarchy’s influence, was not to give Japanese 
American children educational opportunities and a chance to move upward, but rather to contain them in 
the lower rungs of society as plantation laborers.  In fact, many oligarchs viewed public schooling beyond 
the fourth grade not only as a waste of their taxes, but as a menace that “will destroy us.”65 As Fuchs 
demonstrates, the oligarchy saw raising future leaders as entirely the mission of the private schools for 
haoles, and they wanted public schools to preserve the remaining people of color as docile laborers.66  
Shortly after the study’s postponement, the territorial legislature and media began calling for a Japanese 
language school control bill.  The momentum for the survey to focus on Japanese language schools mirrors 
the Hawaii of the time: the Japanese higher wage movement and the ensuing large-scale strike in Oahu 
sugar plantations in January 1920.  This was also influenced by the postwar revival of the Japanese 
exclusion movement in California started by Senator James D. Phelan (Democrat, California) to realize 
their objectives of a stringent alien land law and federal legislation terminating Japanese immigration, and 
removing Nisei citizenship.67  
 
The 1919 Federal Survey 
The April 8, 1919 appointment of Vaughan MacCaughey as Hawaii’s Superintendent of Public 
Instruction dramatically changed the scene.  MacCaughey informed Claxton that he was “anxious to hasten 
the Federal School Survey.”68  A former head of the Department of Natural Sciences and Vice President of 
the Territorial Normal School, MacCaughey had been Professor of Botany at the College of Hawaii since 
1910 and was also the Director of the Hawaii Chapter of the National Education Association (NEA). 
Unlike his predecessor, MacCaughey seemed obsessed with the idea of bringing the federal survey and had 
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his own agenda that would greatly influence the investigation.  Over the next few months, MacCaughey 
sent Claxton a flood of anti-Japanese propaganda and editorials against language schools. With false 
modesty, he wrote Claxton, “I do not wish to ‘pester’ you with promiscuous clippings, but I do feel that 
your survey committee should sense our local situation with reference to the Japanese Language Schools.”  
MacCaughey further wrote: 
The bulk of Hawaii’s school population attends Japanese language schools six days per 
week, throughout practically the entire year.  The teachers in these schools are all aliens 
and are imported from Japan.  They have little or no knowledge of American institutions 
or ideals.69  
  
To MacCaughey, Hawaii’s educational problem was the 40,000 alien illiterates, created by an 
“artificially stimulated immigration,” importing “low grades of agricultural labor (mostly Asiatic)” to work 
on the sugar plantations.70 His sharpest attacks were against the Japanese, the largest ethnic group on the 
Islands, pointing out that Japanese American pupils were 40% of the public schools’ enrollment, growing 
from 1,300 in 1910 to 16,000 by 1919, and 20,651 the next year.  The problem, wrote MacCaughey, is not 
only in their dominant and increasing numbers, but also their language schools that were mostly “under the 
control of reactionary Buddhist priests.”  He labeled the latter as “medieval, ultra-superstitious and 
intensely Japanese,” teaching “Mikado-worship,” claiming they directly conflict with “the efforts of the 
public schools toward genuine Americanization.”71 Emphasizing the importance of religious education in 
an article published before his appointment, MacCaughey contended that Asian immigration brought an 
extraordinary number of “Buddhist Oriental households,” and that “Hawaii  cannot be American until she 
truly Christianizes her population.”72 This and other evidence suggests that MacCaughey’s passion to indict 
Japanese language schools was rooted in his affiliation with the Congregational Church and the Hawaiian 
Evangelical Association.73 Louise H. Hunter, who studied Buddhist-Christian conflict in Hawaii, wrote that 
“With the exception of Takie Okumura, probably no one was more opposed to foreign language schools 
(the Buddhist in particular) than Vaughan MacCaughey” even before he became Superintendent. 
MacCaughey, in fact, was largely responsible for inflating the Japanese school “issue,” as it was not on the 
federal survey agenda before he succeeded Kinney. 74 Aware of his attitudes towards Buddhist language 
schools, “the Japanese press took careful note of MacCaughey’s tirades,” and as predicted, the Japanese 
community found itself amid controversy before the end of MacCaughey’s first year in office.75  
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On October 10, 1919, Frank F. Bunker, the bureau’s urban education specialist, and the survey’s 
director arrived in Hawaii on the Munea. The other two members of the commission joined Bunker later 
that month.76  They were William W. Kemp, Chairman of the Education Department at the University of 
California, who was sent to study elementary and normal schools, and Parke R. Koble, President of 
Akron’s Municipal University, who was charged with investigating higher education.77 The territorial 
government allocated $3,000 to finance the survey for three months.78  
 Bunker conferred with Hawaii’s civic leaders, such as the governor, the superintendent of public 
instruction, territorial education committee members, the deputy attorney general, immigration officials, 
principals of Honolulu’s schools, former Governor Frear, and other prominent leaders.  Bunker reported 
that everyone’s attitude “towards the survey appears to be all that we could possibly ask.”79  Bunker 
quickly identified two problems requiring careful study: teacher supply and the Japanese language schools. 
On the first problem, he explained that most of the rural schools are isolated, remote, and mostly inhabited 
by “Oriental laborers,” that offer “no inducement for a refined, educated young woman.” The teachers from 
the territorial normal schools are products of “the spell of a desire for numbers.” This simply repeats “the 
vicious circle” in which children of immigrants, whom Bunker believed spoke imperfect English 
themselves, parallel “the blind attempt[ing] to lead the blind.”80 Bunker stressed the Japanese language 
school issue, calling it “beyond all other questions.” He also asked Claxton to send him the bureau’s files 
on wartime suppression of foreign language teaching and state laws prohibiting foreign language teaching, 
such as Nebraska’s ban on German language instruction.81  
The survey team visited schools on each of the four major islands by boat, car, and horseback.82 
After visiting public schools and Japanese language schools on the island of Hawaii for almost a week, 
Bunker called the experience illuminating and was confident despite the complicated problems that 
“require much hard, painstaking work to unravel.”83  Within the first few weeks, Bunker realized they had 
underestimated the travel expenses of the study84 and that he had not understood the importance of the 
private schools.85 He explained to Claxton that private schools dominate the entire situation, while public 
schools were considered merely a means to satisfy the “foreigners.”86 After a search for additional funds, 
the governor approved MacCaughey’s suggestion to allocate an additional $2,000 to cover the difference 
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and also the expenses for a fourth survey team member, George R. Twiss, Ohio State University Professor 
of Secondary Education and State high-school inspector, to examine the private schools.87  
In addition to observing schools, survey commission members conferred with “all of the civic 
clubs of the Islands” including the Social Science Club and the College Club. In addition, the commission 
sent questionnaires to all teachers and principals on the Islands. They also solicited opinions of the schools 
from another 200 unspecified “representatives citizens of all races in the Territory.”88 Japanese voices, 
however, were marginalized or at least not recorded. 
News of the federal survey made headlines daily in the territory’s English and Japanese 
newspapers, and was also routinely editorialized on in an effort to influence the commissioners. The Ad 
Club, a group of elites mostly in advertising and related businesses, held a meeting on November 5 to 
discuss “the Japanese language school problem” in Hawaii. Keynote speaker Richard H. Trent condemned 
the present territorial legislature for failing to enact the Japanese language school control bills. He 
reprimanded them as “sowing a wind which … will be reaped as a whirlwind, and shake the foundation of 
Americanism.”89 As a banker and president of the Honolulu Stock Exchange, Trent, like much of the club’s 
membership, was doubtlessly close to the oligarchy.90  Trent lambasted the legislature’s prolonging the 
existence of the Japanese schools, which he claimed had grown so much that lawmakers now could not 
even put them under DPI supervision.  He suggested a remedy to what he called the “dual schooling 
situation” by having Japanese parents choose either to send their children to public schools or privately 
funded Japanese schools so that no child could attend both.  Trent’s alternative proposal was to call for a 
special session of the legislature “for the purpose of legislating them out of existence” and encouraged his 
audience to note which legislators “betray our Americanism.”91 The Ad Club endorsed Trent’s 
recommendations amid the presence of the invited guests from the federal survey commission. The Maui 
News approved of Trent’s proposal and called for immediate action.92  Four days after Trent’s speech, Rev. 
Albert W. Palmer, pastor of Honolulu’s prestigious Central Union Church, lectured on the Japanese 
language school issue to an audience of American Legionaries.93 “These Islands must be 100 percent 
American,” proclaimed Palmer, adding, “It is our responsibility to make them so.”  Palmer claimed, “The 
first and most obvious step is the elimination of the foreign language school,” and he proposed a campaign 
to explain Americanization and “why the foreign language schools are bad and seek their cooperation.”  He 
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cautioned that ruthless, tactless methods could raise resistance towards Americanization and suggested that 
pupils in the eighth grade or above should have opportunities to take any language in public school if there 
is sufficient demand.94 The Ad Club later adopted Palmer’s suggestion in its recommendations on “policy 
and program [for the] foreign language school question.”95 
Fred Makino, activist and publisher of the Hawaii Hochi, blamed plantation owners of reviving 
“the school agitation … again to cloud the higher wage movement among plantation laborers.”  It is 
important to understand that the federal study team came to Hawaii in the midst of a dispute between 
plantation workers and the HSPA. Japanese American workers reorganized the Association for Higher 
Wages, dormant since the 1909 strike, and were demanding higher wages and changes to the bonus system 
which was not adjusting to the skyrocketing postwar inflation.96 Makino and others in the higher wage 
movement perceived the planters’ attack on Japanese language schools primarily as an instrument to 
distract attention from labor’s plea for increased pay.97  Makino ridiculed how the planters rationalized 
their act of abolishing language schools on the incredulous basis that “they are prompted by [the] patri
motive” of Americanization.  He correctly predicted that “abolition of the language schools would be 
unconstitutional.”
otic 
98 In addition, the Hawaii Shimpo warned sugar plantation owners that abolishing 
Japanese language schools would result in a shortage of plantation laborers, as it would encourage Japanese 
to leave Hawaii. On the other hand, Yasutaro Soga, the accommodationist editor of the Nippu Jiji, blamed 
Buddhist priests for the Japanese school agitation.99 
Provoking more public outrage, the Advertiser claimed that not only did Japanese schools not 
teach Christian religion, but that they taught a religion that “regards the Mikado as divine,” incompatible 
with the principles of Americanism. Furthermore, the Advertiser  agitated readers by asking, “Can we 
afford to have future American citizens brought up in the belief that the ruler of a foreign land is superior to 
the government of this country?”100 The editor also pointed out the prevailing use of “pidgin English” 
among the Japanese children and erroneously claimed that foreign language schools prevented them from 
learning English, and even worse, that “they quickly contaminate the children that come from English-
speaking homes.”101  
Upon receiving Bunker’s first draft of what became the report’s first chapter, Claxton 
complemented Bunker’s work on the “population situation,” and replied with further instructions. Claxton, 
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by that time fully aware of MacCaughey’s thoughts on the Japanese schools, encouraged Bunker to “confer 
freely with MacCaughey about what should be done in regard to the Japanese language schools.” However, 
Claxton cautioned, “Under the policies of the United States, it will be very difficult to prohibit schools of 
this kind unless it were definitely proven that they were teaching treasonable things.” Claxton’s own view 
of Hawaii’s Japanese school situation, shared with Bunker before his departure was that these children 
should learn their parents’ native tongue as a second language in the public schools just as other European 
languages are offered. He reiterated this view in his letter: “Of course, this [offering Japanese at public 
schools] would not prevent the organization and maintenance of religious schools of any kind – Christian, 
Mohammedan, Buddhist, or what not, but democracy and freedom must always assume the risks inherent 
in their very nature.”102 On one hand, Claxton had a rather liberal perspective on Americanization; he had 
taken an unpopular position by defending teaching German during World War I103 and had a reputation for 
never making “any religious distinctions in administrative policy.”104  On the other hand, that Claxton 
instructed Bunker to work with MacCaughey suggests pragmatism at best, since Claxton understood 
MacCaughey’s desired outcome for the educational survey.  In either case, Claxton’s heeding seemed not 
to discourage Bunker’s attack on the Japanese schools.  
On December 23, Bunker informed Claxton that he would receive a draft of the second chapter of 
the report, an examination of the foreign language school situation.  Bunker’s letter exudes excitement and 
pride for completing what he called an “accurate study of the facts.”  However, “to be absolutely certain,” 
Bunker claimed he had submitted his report to several “Japanese scholars.”105 Bunker wrote Claxton that 
the “Japanese will make splendid American citizens” and cleared the Japanese government of “attempting 
to exercise any political control over her people in the Territory.”  Rather he saw the Americanization 
problem as “a religious one [,] and the Buddhist and Shinto religions provide a mighty poor soil for the 
growing of American citizens.” He was convinced that if the present Japanese language schools were 
wiped out, “thousands of Japanese parents . . . will be glad for their children to occupy their entire time 
with the English language alone,” since he believed these children attend those schools only out of “the fear 
which their parents have of Buddhist priests and teachers.”  Bunker arrogantly predicted that once the 
Japanese schools were terminated, few of the Japanese students would study Japanese even if the 
opportunity were offered at public schools.106 
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In the same letter, Bunker encouraged Claxton to confer with Governor McCarthy when he came 
to Washington, D.C., in January.  According to “a number of inquiries among confidants of the Governor,” 
Bunker wrote, McCarthy was quite pro-Japanese and “rather inclined to let the language schools alone.” In 
fact, on August 5, 1918 the newly appointed Governor McCarthy had delivered an official address at the 
Hongwanji Temple and publicly approved “the existence and extension of the Japanese school system.” He 
praised the Buddhist temple’s 20 years of teaching Japanese children born in Hawaii the language of their 
parents. The governor told Japanese parents, “I believe you should educate your children to be good 
citizens of the United States, that they be taught the Japanese language and whatever religion their parents 
or guardians think proper.”107However, Bunker had been informed that the governor had changed his 
perspective and became quite “as anti-Japanese as are the rabid agitators on the mainland coast.” The letter 
continued that the governor implied an alarming situation, arising between the United States and Japan to 
editors of the leading newspapers and advised them to “begin, somewhat quietly, the policy of arousing 
public sentiment against the Japanese.”108 The change of heart reflects how the oligarchy co-opted 
McCarthy. As governor, McCarthy was initially critical of the oligarchy and gave them a hard time.  He 
and his treasurer Delbert Metzger administered strict laws to one of the oligarchy’s operations, the 
insurance business.  They also significantly raised the assessment on land belonging to the oligarchs by re-
evaluating them with Metzger’s formula.  However, when McCarthy, who came from a poor Irish family 
and was unsuccessful in various businesses, was approached by one of the Big Five, Henry Baldwin,109 
McCarthy enjoyed being flattered and became more “pliable and acquiesced.”110  Although McCarthy 
“publicly endorsed the Japanese schools as a secondary system for the education of the Japanese,”111 this 
was before the revival of the Japanese higher wage movement. Later, he became even more anti-
Japanese112 to the extent that he came out in favor of California Senator Phelan’s proposal for a 
constitutional amendment to deny the Nisei’s citizenship.113 Bunker urged Claxton to find out the 
governor’s true opinion on the Japanese language school issue to make sure that the survey report would 
not fail the governor’s expectations.114 After Kolbe and Kemp finished their work and left for home, Twiss 
finally arrived in Hawaii on December 23, accompanied by his wife and Mrs. Bunker. Bunker’s surviving 
Hawaii correspondence ended on January 6, 1920, reporting he was waiting for the next ship to return.  
Finally, on May 28, 1920, Bunker mailed from Washington, D.C., 2,000 copies of the report for 
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MacCaughey to distribute in the Islands.115  The report was also serially published in the Honolulu Star 
Bulletin throughout June 1920.116   
The bureau’s files reveal even more actors behind the scenes.  Around the time the commission 
was engaged on the Hawaii survey, Claxton’s office, the Bureau of Education, received a confidential 
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) memoranda regarding Hawaii’s Japanese language school problem.117 
As the United States and Japan competed for power in the Pacific, Hawaii became an important strategic 
location for America’s commercial and military interests. This, combined with the Nikkei population and 
labor movement, and Japan’s growing military, led Hawaii’s military intelligence community to become 
suspicious.118 Umetaro Okumura, Rev. Okumura’s son, working as an HSPA translator and also an ONI 
informant since at least 1918, was likely responsible for some of the “information” that influenced the 
federal survey.119 An ONI report of August 20, 1919 dealt with conflict within the Nikkei community on 
the language school issue and struggles with the series of foreign language school control bills. The report 
began with the line, “The Buddhist priests who hold that the advancement of Emperor worship must be put 
first and foremost in teaching and training of the American born Japanese children … won another victory 
in the Japanese Language School controversy.” According to the report, the Nippu Jiji’s Soga criticized the 
Buddhists’ inconsistent attitude of dealing with the school issue and playing a double game; “though the 
mission emphatically tells the Americans that it favors the preaching of Americanism, as a matter of fact it 
is preaching and spreading the principles of Buddhism through its educational work.”120 The report further 
“confirmed” the popular theory that “Buddhist schools are anti-American,” writing “these Japanese 
themselves in Hawaii who have turned away from Buddhism to Christianity will not concede any possible 
harmony between Buddhist and American democratic ideals.” The report cynically portrayed the Japanese 
as gloating over the victory against the language bill, and praised “the wiser element” who “began at once 
to plan a reformation of the Language School policy” in response to growing public sentiment. We may 
never know the identity of this informant, but it is suggestive that Takie Okumura uses almost the identical 
language in his book, Taiheiyo no Rakuen [Paradise in the Pacific].121 
The ONI had conducted its own investigation of Japanese in Hawaii, and identified, based on the 
May 1918 Army’s Military Intelligence Division’s Merriam report, three supposed sources of anti-
Americanism: the Japanese government, Japanese schools, and Buddhism.  The August 14, 1918 ONI 
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report, produced by “a Japanese informant in Hawaii,” was very similar to the one Claxton received dated 
August 20, 1919 charging, “Buddhist priests in Hawaii, while ostensibly loyal to the United States, are in 
reality doing everything in their power to undermine any American allegiance entertained by the Japanese 
in Hawaii.”122 Army Intelligence also investigated what it perceived as Japanese subversion in Hawaii and 
the means to terminate it. McCarthy wrote to Claxton’s superior, the Secretary of Interior,123 to inform him 
that “at the request of the Intelligence Bureau of the Hawaiian Department, there was introduced at the 
regular Session of the Legislature in 1919 an act providing for the regulation of foreign language schools.” 
Facing intense resistance of the Japanese to the school control bills and their defeat, the military urged 
legislative support for military control.124 These ONI and MID reports on “Japanism” and subversive 
agents labeled the Japanese language schools and Buddhist temples as centers of anti-Americanism. 
 
The Report 
The published federal survey report consists of eight chapters, of which chapter three, “The 
Foreign Language Schools,” was written by Bunker himself.125 The report seems greatly influenced by 
Rev. Okumura in terms of his perspective on the Japanese language school situation in relation to his 
conflict with the dominant Buddhist sect. The first half of the chapter describes the origin of the Japanese 
schools, credited much to early Japanese Christian missionaries brought over by the Hawaii Mission Board. 
The report introduces the now famous narrative of why Okumura established the first Japanese school in 
Honolulu. The story is of a little Nisei girl’s language, an unintelligible mixture of English, Japanese, and 
Hawaiian words, which not only concerned Okumura, but also gave him “a further opportunity . . . to 
advance the Christian faith in the goodwill of the people of their race.”  The school started in very poor 
conditions, yet soon received contributions as the number of students multiplied, and Okumura erected a 
school building.  However, worried that the success of his school would give Buddhists a pretext for 
starting their own schools, Okumura supposedly separated himself and religion from the school’s 
administration.126 In his Seventy Years of Divine Blessings, Okumura gave an account of his struggle with 
cutting off the relationship between religion and Japanese education. He wrote of frankly discussing his 
concerns with Hongwanji Bishop Enmyo Imamura and of their supposed reaching of an agreement. 
However, Okumura claimed that Buddhists simply opened their own schools, and enrollment at his school 
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plunged from 700 to 200.  Okumura explained, “this was the real beginning of oft-repeated friction 
between religiously-independent and Buddhist schools.”127    
Bunker’s report on the Buddhist schools focuses on the Hongwanji sect, emphasizing its scale: 
75,000 members, 60 churches and substations, 30 Young Men’s Buddhist Association, 40 Young Women’s 
Buddhist Association chapters, and 42 Japanese language schools, embracing some 7,100 children and 155 
teachers in Hawaii alone. The report then stresses its strength as an organization and power over its 
followers depicting the image of a medieval and dogmatic cult. Bunker wrote that the head of the sect, the 
“Hoss,” is seen as “a living Buddha,” and his representative in the islands, the “Kantoku,” (Bishop 
Imamura) “has absolute authority.”128 The image of the teachers at Hongwanji schools, the report portrays, 
is of anti-democratic agents of “Japanism” providing fuel for the anti-Japanese activists’ charge that they 
teach “Mikadoism.” The report casts suspicion on the schools’ preference for teachers from Japan over 
Hawaii Nisei. It used the following quote by a Buddhist priest to show that this was not only because of the 
different language ability of teachers but also because  
Any man who is to teach Japanese language schools should not be a man with 
democratic ideas. The language school is not a place for a man with strong 
democratic ideas. A man of strong Japanese ideas should be its teacher.129  
 
This episode is also found in Okumura’s Taiheiyo no Rakuen, regarding an incident that supposedly 
happened at a Maui Japanese Education Association conference.130   
The survey’s summary of the Japanese Education Association was written in an ambiguous 
manner, either the result of editing or Bunker’s hope that one would read between lines to understand its 
intent. Teachers established the association in 1914 to coordinate affairs of the Japanese language schools. 
According to the survey, it was originally proposed to include members besides teachers, but this was 
rejected at the first meeting. Their meetings since “have had no representation from those outside the 
teaching corps.”131  This refers to Okumura’s 1915 effort to revise the fifth article of the association’s 
proposed bylaws, restricting regular memberships in the association to teachers in Hawaii.132  Bunker’s 
description of the association suggests that the association, consisting exclusively of Japanese teachers, 
many of whom were Buddhist priests, had been administered without external review although Okumura 
and Christian Japanese schools proposed to open it to the public in order to reduce public suspicion of these 
schools. The report also implied how Buddhist language schools cause trouble and need outside control.  
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Bunker wrote, “Indeed, the association has so far found it very difficult to outline an educational policy 
which will command the support of the Hongwanji, the Jodo, the Independent, and the Christian 
groups.”
ries 






o have to compete 
with this survival of medievalism and nationalism flaunted under our very noses.”137 
133 
   The federal commission also examined the Japanese language textbooks that were originally 
complied by the Japanese Ministry of Education but revised by the association in accordance with their 
policy of Americanizing the Nisei.134  The report was equally critical of their contents, including remarks 
such as, “There are no distinctly American subjects treated in this book, and only one Hawaiian subject”; 
“One only No. 16, entitled ‘Washington’s Honesty,’ . . . deals with an American subject”; and,  “Only two 
lessons,” in Book Four “touch on matters in any sense American.”135 The translations or synopsis of sto
of loyal samurai, a famous Buddhist priest, a Japanese folktale, and the Japanese Imperial Rescript on 
Education were included in the report.  It even hinted of the Japanese government’s involvem
 revision as it used funds from the Prince Fushimi Memorial Educational Fund.136  
Some anonymous public school teachers’ and principals’ opinions of the Japanese language 
schools, in response to the commissioner’s questionnaire, were included in the published survey. Almost a
of the printed responses expressed themselves in opposition to Japanese language schools; e.g., “It is too 
much physical and mental work on the children”; “retarding the children’s progress on English”; “a large 
measure to counteract patriotism and Americanization”; and, many simply said, “they have to go.”  Most
these opinions were likely influenced more by the media’s hysterical portrayal of the Japanese schools 
rather than on personal experience.  Many teachers claimed that “The Japanese schools, under cover of 
religious instruction, teach the children loyalty to their Emperor and country”; “The Japanese school at 
____ is under the control of priests whose religion opposes the making of real Americans”; “If the Japan
schools are continued we shall have a mongrel citizenship, both in language and customs”; and, “What 
compatibility is there between Mikado worship, ancestor worship and the teaching of democracy?”  Their 
opinions also spelled out the idea of assimilating a subordinate culture to the dominant society, and al
white supremacy. They stated that “We can eventually mold them into real Americans if we have no 
Japanese competition”; “We must help them to assimilate and to develop a true love and respect for our 
American ideals and ideas”; and, “It is a lasting insult to every real American teacher t
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A key part of the survey was the recommendations of three patriotic and civic organizations, the 
Daughters of the American Revolution, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Ad Club of Honolulu for 
legislative action.  The report offers no explanations as to why these white civic organizations were labeled 
important and somehow representative of public sentiment.  Each of the three organizations had passed 
resolutions opposing the Japanese language schools. The Daughters of the American Revolution concluded 
that “foreign-language schools are not only unnecessary, but a menace to the unity and safety of our 
Nation.”138 The Chamber of Commerce and Ad Club both recommended the schools be placed under DPI 
supervision. The Ad Club further proposed a policy for their gradual elimination “as rapidly as may be 
wise.”139  
The commission concluded its analysis that the language schools are “centers of an influence 
which, if not distinctly anti-American, is certainly un-American.” Perceiving the foreign language school 
issue through religious lenses, they indicted these schools: 
Although the commission recognizes the inherent right of every person in the United 
States to adopt any form of religious worship which he desires, nevertheless it holds that 
the principle of religious freedom to which our country is unswervingly committed does 
not demand that practices and activities must be tolerated in the name of religion which 
make the task of training for the duties and responsibilities of American citizenship a 
well-nigh hopeless one.  The commission, therefore, feels no hesitancy in recommending 
as a first and important step in clearing away the obstacles from the path of the Territorial 
public-school system that all foreign-language schools to be abolished.140         
     
The survey commission’s recommendation was radically more severe than the measures resolved by either 
the Chamber of Commerce or the Ad Club which proposed to allow these schools to survive under DPI 
supervision. The commission also predicted that few Japanese parents would have their children learn 
Japanese once pressure from Buddhist priests was removed. The commission’s most important 
recommendations on Japanese language schools were: (1) that the legislature abolish all such schools at its 
next session; (2) create a foreign language division in the DPI; (3) take over the Japanese school buildings 
for the use of the public school system; (4) that public schools should offer foreign language classes taught 
by teachers employed by the DPI at the pupils’ expense; and (5) lengthen the school day to add agricultural 
and vocational instruction.141  It should be noted that the recommendations were largely drawn from 
proposals by the Ad Club, with the exception of recommending “immediate abolition,” rather than “gradual 
elimination” proposed by the Ad Club.  However, the most distinctive characteristic of the report was that it 
not only suggests the abolition of such schools, but offered specific instructions on how to do so; Japanese 
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school buildings after closing should be purchased inexpensively and utilized for public school use, and it 
went so far as to suggest how to conduct this project peacefully so that “it may be accomplished with good 
feeling and good will on the part of all.”142  The commissioners tried to project an air of objectivity and 
authority as a federal study without stating specifically what aspects of these schools the commission saw 
as “un-American” and should be abolished.   
 
Conclusion 
Reaction on the islands was immediate. Lorrin A. Thurston, publisher of the Advertiser, criticized 
the commission’s report and the subsequent school control bills as un-American, devoid of the spirit of 
freedom, and “inexcusably tyrannical . . . to make it a penal offense for a man to teach his own child his 
own language.”143 However, the power of a study conducted and published by the United States 
government was enormous and encouraged many organizations to produce school control bills.144 The 
federal report also led Japanese community leaders to yield to the dominant group’s desire despite all their 
endeavors to protect their cultural and linguistic heritage. Rather than further aggravating hostile territorial 
legislators by defending Japanese language schools,145 a group of Japanese leaders drafted a compromise 
bill. With an endorsement by Honolulu’s Chamber of Commerce, it easily passed at a special session of the 
Hawaii legislature and was immediately signed by Governor McCarthy on November 24, 1920.146 Act 30, 
as it became known, was written following the guidelines recommended by the commission with only a 
few modifications. It placed foreign language schools under the DPI, “so that Americanism of their pupils 
would be promoted” and required their teachers to obtain certification from the DPI.147 The effect of the 
report was not limited to the Islands. After the vehement resistance of Japanese in Hawaii was suppressed, 
a school control bill modeled after Hawaii’s was passed “without strong opposition from the Japanese” in 
California.148 This encouraged the exclusionists’ attack on Nisei’s rights of American citizenship on the 
false premise that language school attendance was evidence of their “disloyalty” to the United States.149   
The federal survey of education in Hawaii conducted by the Bureau of Education was a typical 
example of progressive research, whereby professionally trained scholars systematically collect data and 
scientifically analyze a problem and propose solutions. The study, as we have seen, however, was limited 
as well as highly biased. Although the commission supposedly solicited opinions on the schools from 
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“some 200 representatives citizens of all races in the Territory,”150 there is no record they ever contacted 
Japanese teachers or the community in general, with the probable exception of Rev. Okumura and his 
son.151 The commission’s analysis of the Japanese schools was highly biased, based on rumor and 
prejudice against Buddhism. It officially condoned the exclusionists’ image of these schools as agents of 
the Japanese Imperial government.  Moreover, modern progressive researchers could not overcome the 
constraint of colonialism, as exemplified by the College Club’s Agnes Weaver, who wrote “Ten per cent of 
us are trying to make the ninety per cent an English speaking people with the fundamental institutions of










 organize themselves to improve their working conditions, planters 
endeavored to reassert control.  
52  
Claxton’s view of Hawaii’s Japanese schools is still not clear and his remarks that  “Under the 
policies of the United States, it will be very difficult to prohibit schools of this kind unless it were
proven that they were teaching treasonable things,” could be interpreted either as discouraging a 
recommendation to close such schools or insinuating the need to produce “evidence.” However, given the 
pressure from military intelligence as well as from Hawaii’s government and oligarchy through his superior 
in the Department of Interior,153 Claxton
 published recommendations.   
The role of the HSPA on the federal survey concerning the Japanese language schools seemed to 
have been one of ambivalence. When Issei leaders fought several school control measures in early months 
of 1919, one of their strategies was to send resolutions to their plantation bosses requesting support for 
defeat.  At a March 1919 HSPA meeting held in Hilo, planters  unanimously agreed that if the foreign 
language school control bill in the legislature (Lyman’s bill) passed, its implementation should be delayed 
for two to three years until the current teachers would be ready to meet the requirements.154  The planters’ 
attitude towards Japanese language schools was not for abolition, but rather to maintain them.  However, 
this was just before the higher wage movement organized first by the Young Men’s Buddhist Associatio
members on the island of Hawaii began in October 1919.155  Beforehand, many planters had subsidized
these schools as an enticement for Japanese laborers to stay in Hawaii; however, as Nikkei became th
largest labor force and learned to
21 
Hawkins suggested that planters held varying opinions on the Japanese language schools. Some 
thought a measure to eliminate these schools would bring undesirable consequences over the long term, 
since modern public education would raise Nisei as “too” American to stay at the bottom of the socio-
economic ladder. Granting Japanese Americans their own education system would separate them from 
access to the mainstream, and in turn, from the worlds of politics and economy.  This echoes Miyasaki’s 
observation on how the oligarchy perceived public education. She criticized the irrelevance of Fuchs’ 
explanation for the oligarchy’s detachment from public education between the Annexation and 1920.  She 
argued that “it would be absurd for the oligarchy to bring such a [public education] system under its wing, 
finance it, empower it with the task of training and Americanizing the thousands of children of their labor 
force, and yet allow it to run itself as it pleased . . . as indeed, it did not.”156 The same theory would apply 
to Japanese schools. The planters, who supplied land, constructed school buildings, and sometimes 
subsidized teachers’ salaries, had no reason not to take advantage of these schools and attempt to retain 
some control over the Japanese laborers through control of these schools. This split among the planters is a
more likely explanation as to why the Japanese school control bills initially did not become law, in add
to the vehement protest from the nonenfranchised Japanese community. The report likely satisfied the 
oligarchy’s expectations since the threat of abolition of the schools allowed them either to wipe the s





As this study of the Federal Survey of Education shows, the movement to control Japanese 
language schools in Hawaii was a pioneering effort of nativist Americanizers to “stamp out cultural and 
ideological diversity;”157 however, it also involved a more complex set of actors desiring to control 
Japanese Americans’ future. Nativists saw their control over the schools as critical since it would allow 
them to influence the habitus158 of the Nisei, establishing a foundation of physical and mental structure for 
them to remain in the lower class of the white dominant society.  They endeavored to influence the 
education of second generation immigrants since they knew that education was the most promising 
investment to mold “mass” laborers by a handful of the ruling class.  For the oligarchs, controlling the 
Japanese language school situation was a double-edged sword. They perceived the schools as agents of 
social control over the Issei, who in turn believed the schools equaled hope for Nisei to maintain their 
heritage and go beyond what they achieved as immigrant laborers. The planters kept such schools as a 
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“hostage,” economically supporting them when the Issei parents behaved well as tamed workers, but 
threatening the life of the schools when the laborers went beyond their control.  
For Japanese immigrants, the Japanese language school was a public sphere and symbol of 
cultural preservation and success as immigrant communities in Hawaii, and it was also a contested symbol 
of power and economic resources for religious organizations. This echoes Tamura’s synthesis that the real 
Japanese language school question was “who would control this teaching, the territorial government or 
‘alien’ groups like Buddhist organizations and immigrant associations.”159  The religious conflict between 
Christian and Buddhist clergy developed amidst the tightly woven battlefield, nativists’ ruling stance vs. 
Japanese community resistance; Christianity was raised to a means and measurement of Americanization, 
while Buddhism was labeled as a sign of Japanese origins and ethnic identity. As Okumura, representative 
of the Christian missionaries was obviously losing this battle, he later created a tie with the planters, and 
under the guise of Americanization, Okumura promoted the idea among Nikkei to present themselves as 
the ideal labor force to support Hawaii’s future economy.160 
Bunker, the year after the publication of the Hawaii school survey, was “rewarded” for his work 
with an executive position in Honolulu’s Pan-Pacific Union which was supported by private and public 
funds to promote the relations between Pacific nations.161 Confident and proud of the report, Bunker wrote, 
“I believe, furthermore, that it will be accepted by all as a satisfactory solution to a very difficult problem. I 
am very sure, therefore, that no statement has been made which can be challenged.”162 Bunker’s prediction, 
however, soon proved to be dead wrong. The Palama Japanese Language School, and eventually 84 other 
schools, challenged the constitutionality of the DPI’s harsh school control actions in Farrington v. 
Tokushige.163  After several territorial court challenges, on February 21, 1927, the United States Supreme 
Court supported the Ninth Circuit Court’s decision and declared Act 30 unconstitutional in light of the 
Fourteenth Amendment based on Supreme Court precedent, Meyer v. Nebraska, Bartels v. Iowa, and 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.164   
The survey branded Japanese language schools as “un-American, if not anti-American,”165 an 
accusation that would haunt Japanese Americans for the next three decades.166 In order to understand the 
social meanings of the Japanese language school attack in relation to the formation of Japanese American 
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identity, historians should fully explore the movement against Japanese language schools as developed on 
the mainland in tandem with Hawaii.167  
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